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Abstract. This paper raises the question of a policy for conflict in the making for the EU: 
the European Defense and Security Policy. After a brief presentation of our analytical method, 
we structure the paper in three axes. First, where does CSDP come from and what are its 
main objectives? Then, what is European specificity in developing specific crisis management 
tools, and how do these tools work and socialize the diplomatic and politico-military actors 
involved? Last but not least, how does CSDP interplay between Brussels and the member 
states? What does CSDP change for them, and what are its obvious and more pregnant limits 
up to now? CSDP constitutes a way for the Europeans to exit the world order of the Cold War 
and aims at providing the EU with a median way of crisis and conflict management between 
the approaches developed by traditional international organizations as NATO, the UNO or 
the OSCE. CSDP incarnates also the commitment of the three leading countries in defense 
and security matters in Europe–France, Great Britain and Germany- to overcome the shock 
of the Balkans crisis where Europe had been characterized by its division and inability to act 
effectively to solve the conflict. Therefore the member states had built specific organs, tools and 
procedures in the framework of CSDP. The originality and added value of the EU with its 
crisis management policy as the heart of CSDP is to propose an integrated approach combining 
military and civilian instruments. This however raises several fundamental questions. CSDP 
still lacks cross-pillar coherence, particularly regarding the financing of CSDP operations. 
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This also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states: deploying 
troops is still a national sovereign decision and EU states keep on analyzing situations in 
the light of their national security interest. Yet CSDP combined with the new trends in 
military socialization since the 80’s constitute a strong incentive to reform both the armies 
and military education. Thus CSDP seems to be a hopeful way of developing a European 
crisis management policy putting into light the assets of the EU in this area.
Keywords: European integration, defense, Europeanization, international relations, 
France- Germany- security policy.
Introduction 
The European Union has long been – and still is for some authors1 – associated 
with the image of a civilian or normative power. Back to the 1970’s, the IR theory 
witnessed a debate opposing two trends regarding this subject: the analysts who view 
the EC-and then EU – as a civilian power2 versus the ones that view the EC-EU as a 
potential superpower3. These two trends underlie two different positions on the role 
of the European Union in the world and in international affairs. François Duchêne, 
leader of the « civilian power » analysts, used to analyze the European Community 
as a civilian power characterized by the use of a soft power (in opposition to military 
hard power) anchored in its civilian tools on the benefit of a community of states which 
have mutually given up the use of military violence among them, and which encourage 
other states to do as well (this is the idea of normativity)4. Duchêne focuses on the idea 
that a European foreign policy should aim at promoting democracy, human rights and 
peaceful cooperation. The authors thinking in terms of civilian power5 actually draw their 
analytical inspiration from the German model of foreign policy using mostly economical 
levers to address some critical international issues as environmental threats and favoring 
a free and open trade6. The notion of civilian power also draws on the idea of “security 
1 Maull, H. Europe and the new balance of global order. International Affairs. 2005, 81(4): 775−799; Whitman, 
R. Muscles from Brussels. The demise of civilian power Europe? In: Elgström, O.; Smith, M. (eds.). The 
European Union’s Role in International Politics. Concepts and analysis. London, Routledge: ECPR Studies 
in European Political Science, 2006.
2 Duchêne, F. La Communauté Européenne et les aléas de l’interdépendance. In: Kohnstamm, M.; Hager, W. 
L’Europe avec un grand E. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1973.
3 Galtung, J. The European Community, a superpower in the making. London: Allen and Unwin, 1973.
4 Duchêne, F., op. cit.
5 Maull, H. Germany and Japan: the new civilian powers. Foreign Affairs. 1990, 69(5): 91−106; Maull, 
H. Germany and the use of force: still a “civilian power”? Survival. 2000, 42(2): 56−80; Smith, K. 
Beyond the civilian power EU debate. Politique Européenne. 2005, 17: 63−82; Linklater, A. A European 
civilising process? In Hill, Ch.; Smith, M. (eds.). International Relations and the European Union. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.
6 Smith, K., ibid.
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community” issue by Karl Deutsch in the 1950’s7: in the frame of a security community 
the member states do not consider physical power –and by the way military power- as 
a legitimate means to solve violence and political problems anymore. On the contrary 
these states rely on mutual communication processes (cybernetic model) between social 
elites as well as between populations. Karl Deutsch took the example of the role of the 
European integration process in promoting mutual trust between the French and German 
populations after WWII. Moreover in Duchêne’s view, nuclear deterrence has de facto 
emptied out military power in Europe and thus given a real added-value to civilian frames 
of influence and action: the leitmotiv is to invest the economic and political channels to 
make the EC a normative and civilian power8. Other authors recently took advantage of 
historical sociology –and more precisely Elias’s Civilyzing Process (1975)- to analyze 
European integration as an equivalent civilyzing process reefing to the development of 
self-constraint and its diffusion9. Robert Kagan also points out new civilizing missions 
for the EU, rooted in the discovery of perpetual peace by the Europeans10. On the other 
hand, a second analytical trend used to analyze the EC as a putative superpower11. And if 
some authors still considered Europe as a civilian power in 1998 regarding its incapacity 
to act militarily in the Balkans12, the evolution of the EU since the end of the Cold War 
seems to prove him right, the EU developing from 1999 on a common defense policy 
(CSDP) backed on proper European military and non-military tools. We agree with 
Karen Smith to analyze the raise of CSDP as the end of the civilian power Europe13. 
Thus, my paper aims at developing a reflection on the CSDP as a tool for the EU 
in its external relations and on the international scene. In the globalized world the EU 
is increasingly facing the question of security, mostly outside its borders. But where 
does CSDP come from and what are its aims? To what extent does CSDP constitute 
a Europeanized or “Brusselsized” social configuration and enables us to speak of a 
European crisis management policy in the making? What are the problems and blockades 
encountered? We will rely on this set of questions to propose an analysis divided 
into three parts. Whereas the most part of the literature on CFSP and CSDP relies on 
integration theories (mostly intergovernmentalism, institutionalism, functionalism) or 
IR, we chose to rely on policy analysis with a special historical sociological focus. We 
tend to analyze CSDP as a specific social configuration in the making, which enables 
to interplay between the macro level of member states and the micro level of the agents 
(officers, diplomats, politicians). Such an analytical approach is not yet very developed14 
7 Deutsch, K. Political community in the North-Atlantic area. Princeton University Press, 1957.
8 Duchêne, F., supra note 2, p. 43.
9 Linklater, A., supra note 5.
10 Kagan, R. Of paradise and power: America and Europe in the new world order. London: Atlantic Books, 
2004.
11 Galtung, J., supra note 3.
12 Whitman, R., supra note 1; Hill, Ch.; Wallace, W. Introduction: actors and actions. In: Hill, Ch. (ed.). The 
actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy. London: Routledge, 1996.
13 Smith, K., supra note 5.
14 Buchet de Neuilly, Y. Une Europe sans voix: les conditions du recours à la PESC. In: Helly, D.; Petiteville, 
F. L’Union Européenne, acteur international. Paris: L’Harmattan, 2005; Mérand, F. Dying for the Union? 
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but still shows good potentialities to analyze European integration more thinly15. I thus 
partly rely on social constructivists tools as discourse analysis but my use of these tools 
is quite instrumental. This special configuration involves socializing processes and 
weighs on the former social practices of the actors involved, but also interacts with 
the existing security and defense national configurations, what can explain some of the 
difficulties of CSDP’s development.
The first part of the paper will examine the genesis of CSDP and try to put into light 
what makes EU’s specificity a would-be peace actor in crisis management regarding this 
genesis. The second will focus on the functioning of the European crisis management in 
the making as a social configuration implying socializing processes and new practices. 
The third part of the paper will focus on the challenges encountered by the EU as a peace 
actor in its interaction with the national security policies.
1. CSDP as a European Way of Exiting the Cold War and  
Spreading Peace in the World
The end of the Cold War raised the global question of European and world security 
in a challenged international context. New threats, new forms of conflictuality (most of 
the conflicts are today intra-state conflicts16) imply new answers to the evolving security 
dilemma17. Security today doesn’t only concern the military aspects of conflicts but 
also economic, cultural and social aspects. Thus the old instruments created in a time of 
bipolar confrontation, as the North Atlantic Alliance, are not so appropriate to deal with 
this new form of insecurity and instability in the world. The fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990’s opened a policy window18 for the 
EU to quit its status of “economic giant but political dwarf” so as to work at becoming 
Military officers and the creation of a European defence force. European Societies. 2003, 5(3): 253−282; 
Mérand, F. Social representations in the European Security and Defence Policy. Cooperation and Conflict. 
2006, 41(2): 131−152.
15 Sociological approaches are particularly useful to understand European integration because it helps 
the analysts look into something which is more then the EU structures: that is a European “sociality”. 
Christiansen, T.; Jorgensen, K. E.; Wiener, A. The social construction of Europe. Journal of European 
Public Policy. 1999, 6(4): 528−544; Georgakakis, D. Construction sociale de l’Europe et sociologie politique 
européenne: perspectives communes et nouveaux matériaux de recherche. Regards sociologiques. 2004, 
27/28; Guiraudon, V. L’espace sociopolitique européen: un champ encore en friche? Cultures et conflits. 
2000, 38/39: 7−37; Guiraudon, V. The EU through European’s eyes: political sociology and the EU studies. 
EUSA Review. 2006, 19(1): 1−5.
16 Evans, G. Cooperative Security and Intrastate Conflict. Foreign Policy. 1994: 3; Hassner, P. La violence et 
la paix. Paris: Seuil, Coll. « Essais », 2000, p. 15.
17 This notion has been elaborated by J. Hertz and means that when a state reinforces its security, he will 
automatically concern other states because of the anarchic and competitive structure of international scene.
18 Kingdon, J. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. University of Michigan, Longman, 2003 (1st ed., 
1984).
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a global player19, implying a real foreign policy on the long run. As Knud Jorgensen 
points it, this lead to another world implying another task for Europe’s armed forces20.
1.1. Lessons-Learned from the Balkans: Surfing on NATO New Frame  
 of Reference to Enable European Action in World  
 Peace and Security
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO engaged in a strategic reform aiming at two 
main objectives: enlargement to the Eastern European countries (London Declaration, 
July 6th 1990) and a new strategic concept (Rome Declaration, November 8th 1990) 
based on a global security approach and backed by rapid reaction forces composed of 
multinational military rapidly deployable units21. Thus the setting up of the Eurocorps and 
Euroforces between 1992 and 1996 participate in this global reform context regarding 
military action in Europe: from now on the governments and military high leaders have 
started focusing on crisis management in an international system characterized by the 
coexistence of often competing intergovernmental organizations and new risks linked 
with political instability in lots of regions in the world. The Petersberg Tasks launched 
at the WEU summit in summer 1992 also played an important role in the genesis of 
CSDP as a potential conflict management tool for Europe22: there was historically no 
European multilateral crisis management. Most of European states have conducted 
rescue tasks individually -against hunger in Africa for instance- or under ad hoc 
coalitions – evacuation tasks23. Thus- as we will show it later- crisis management in the 
EU is necessarily strongly dependent on national traditions and practices in this specific 
area24. The Petersberg Tasks include three types of missions: humanitarian missions; 
peacekeeping missions; peace enforcement and even armed intervention. The Petersberg 
Tasks also focus on multilateralism with NATO and the UN. These Tasks provide the 
EU with a spectrum of action, as they have been included in the Amsterdam Treaty and 
are now part of the CSDP framework.
1.2. Policy Window and Advocacy Coalitions in the Setting up of CSDP
This global reflection on security and crisis management in Europe engaged within 
NATO reform combined with the Balkans crisis to make the European governments 
19 This aim is particularly materialized in the French term “Europe-puissance”, which belongs to the global 
representation of the EU as a real power in the world as it shows in French political discourses on the 
question.
20 Jorgensen, K. E. (ed.). European approaches to crisis management. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997, p. 3.
21 The document can be consulted on NATO website [interactive]. [accessed 01-10-2011]. <http://www.nato.
int/docu/fonda/b900706a.htm>. 
22 When we employ the term “Europe”, is mostly in the sense of the European Union, and not so much in the 
geographical dimension of the word. 
23 Jorgensen, K. E., op. cit., 20.
24 Ibid., p. 140.
Delphine Deschaux-Beaume. The EU as a Global Peace Actor? A Challenge Between EU Conflict Management...1186
aware of how badly equipped they were to cope with the new emerging security 
challenges. The Yugoslav crisis then the Balkans wars in the 1990’s showed European 
dependence towards Washington concerning military conflict management25. As Richard 
Holbrooke, the US Dayton negotiator, noted, Europeans had been “sleeping through the 
night”26. This opened a policy window for small circles of actors at the top of the states 
foreign policy administrations, mostly French-German at first, acting as a transnational 
advocacy coalition27, then relying on the Blair administration in 1998-1999 after the 
British political changeover which lead the Labor party to power in Britain in spring 
1997. This advocacy coalition put the question of constructing military instruments for 
the EU on the European political agenda. Here the use of policy analysis with a more 
sociological eye enables us to better understand the role of some leading policy actors 
in France, Germany and Britain. The idea that European foreign policy needs military 
instruments is not so old: the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 had 
put defense matters aside from the European integration process over forty years28. 
And the competition with NATO on this issue was cleared at the Alliance Summit 
in Copenhagen in July 1991: for the first time, NATO –which included Washington 
recognized that the European Community was legitimate to develop a European defense 
identity by admitting that the Twelve are inclined to make necessary decisions so as to 
express both a common foreign and security policy and a military role for Europe29. Thus 
NATO also admitted in Rome in November 1991 that such a process was part of the 
Alliance’s renovation30. There was then a political opportunity for the Europeans to raise 
the issue of a European instrument for conflict management. Therefore at Maastricht, 
under a strong French-German impulsion based on the political entrepreneurship31 
showed by Mitterrand and Kohl32, the European member states issued an entire part 
of the Treaty dedicated to the European Common Foreign and Security Policy (Title 
V), including “the definition in the long run of a common defense policy, which could 
lead, on a suitable time, to a common defense.” (Maastricht Treaty, article J.4-1). This 
opened the way for these coalized French-German-British actors to launch the European 
Security and Defense Policy later, at the Cologne summit in June 1999. Yet, the chosen 
25 Petiteville, F. La politique internationale de l’Union européenne. Paris: Presses de Sciences-Po. Peyrouse, 
S., 2006, p. 71.
26 Jorgensen, K. E., supra note 20, p. 4.
27 Sabatier, P.; Jenkins-Smith, H. Policy change and learning. Boulder: Westview Press, 1993; Sabatier, P.; 
Jenkins-Smith, H. The Advocacy Coalition Framework. An assessment. In: Sabatier, P. (ed.). Theories of the 
policy process. Boulder: Westiew Press, 1999.
28 Duke, S. The elusive quest for European Security: From EDC to CFSP. Bakingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
29 Maury, J.-P. La construction européenne – La sécurité et la défense. Paris: PUF, Coll. « Politique 
d’aujourd’hui », 1996, p. 169.
30 Guilhaudis, J.-F. La réorganisation du système de sécurité occidental en Europe, La réorganisation du 
système de sécurité occidental en Europe. Grenoble: Université Pierre Mendès-France, Cahiers du CEDSI, 
1997, n° 18, p. 73.
31  Kingdon, J., supra note 18.
32  The two heads of state made large use of the practice of common letters sent to the other European partners so 
as to insufflate the reflection on a European foreign and defense policy in 1990-1991. They were particularly 
three letters before the European Council in Dublin (April 1990), in November 1990 and in October 1991. 
This last letter opened the way to the creation of the Eurocorps.
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formulation –voluntarily vague and conditional- shows how controversial the subject of 
European defense and security was and still is among the European member states: if 
France, strongly supported by Germany, had initiated the debate, there where numbers 
of states accepting it on the principle but in the NATO framework (Britain, Netherlands, 
Portugal). Some states even refused fundamentally any military competence for the EU 
out off exclusive dedication to NATO (Denmark) or out of neutrality (Ireland). Thus, 
the articles of the Maastricht Treaty about European Foreign Policy are a compromise in 
between: CFSP should respect the commitments resulting from the Washington Treaty 
for some states and stay compatible with the defense and security policy conducted in 
the NATO framework. In the beginning of the 1990’s, European defense as envisaged 
into two possible frames, linked by a third organization: the Western European Union. 
Thus the WEU was both considered as the European pillar of NATO and the military 
arm of the EU after the Maastricht ICG. 
Britain crossed the “European Defense Rubicon” at Saint-Malo in December 1998: 
overnight, a declaration was written by the close counselors of the French and British 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Head of state and Prime Minister. For the first time, 
The British have accepted the principle of a European defense capacity autonomous 
from NATO and the United States. The document mentioned the need for “credible 
military forces” for the EU, so as to enable the European Community to act in case of 
international crisis “where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged”33. This lead in June 
1999 at Cologne to the quick Europeanization of the Saint-Malo agreement and the 
launching of the European Security and Defense Policy34. Thus the EU’s nature changed: 
it was an exclusively civilian power, and with CSDP, the EU has now a potentiality to 
become a global player: the EU will then have a choice to respond crisis with a plurality 
of tools, from civilian and normative tools to military management35. CSDP opened the 
way to an emerging conflict management tool or the European Union. 
2. Towards a European Conflict Management Method: is CSDP 
a “Brusselized” Policy?
CSDP is not, as the Common Agricultural Policy, a top-down methodical approach 
emanating from the European institutions in Brussels; on the contrary, CSDP is an 
intergovernmental policy much more based on an inductive process consisting in defining 
33 Yet Saint-Malo doesn’t mean a total turnaround on the British side: Tony Blair claimed on May, 10th 1999 in 
the Financial Times that NATO remained the cornerstone of any defense capacity and there was no question 
of a European army. Saint-Malo joint Declaration, in Rutten, M. De Saint-Malo à Nice: les textes fondateurs 
de la défense européenne. Volume I, Cahiers de Chaillot n°47, Paris, Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’UE, 
2001, p. 11.
34 Gnesotto, N. (dir.). La PESD. Les cinq premières années. 1999-2004. Paris: Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité de 
l’UE, 2004, p. 46.
35 Manners, I. Normative power Europe: beyond the crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy. 2006, 
13(2): 182−199.
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a have and a can do before determining a will36. CSDP evolves to generate a conflict 
management tool for the EU according to the lessons-learned and feedbacks from the 
European operations. The novelty of the European Defense Policy when comparing 
to the former projects is its search for permanence. Indeed organs and procedures for 
conflict and crisis management have been created on the European level. That’s why we 
rely on the concept of social configuration here37, where other authors use Bourdieu’s 
notion of field38. The European Defense Policy consists in a rationalization process of 
creating a specific configuration in the frame of the European construction. This specific 
security configuration owns its own logics, concurrences and induces some emerging 
socialization processes for its most committed actors (the French, German, British and 
Belgian politico-military actors, i.e. diplomats, military officers, political leaders). 
From 1999 on, the member states committed themselves to develop a large 
panel of management conflict tools in this specific framework combining civilian and 
military instruments as well as judicial, political and economical means. Every IGC 
since Cologne aimed at providing the EU with an autonomous capacity to respond to 
international crisis where off NATO is not engaged and within the principles of the UN 
Charta (Chapter VII). The major objectives of CSDP are not to militarize the EU but to 
solve other’s conflict and help building a “secure Europe in a better world”39. This all 
process leads to enormous changes in the EU: what is at stake since Cologne is to go 
beyond a rhetorical diplomacy. 
2.1. CSDP Crisis Management Tools: a European Method in the Making
We chose here to analyze CSDP as c conflict management tool for the EU by asking 
the question of the specificity of European conflict management in the making. 
2.1.1. CSDP Organs and Conflict Management Procedures
There are three main CSDP organs in Brussels: the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS, 
which were created at the Nice IGC in 2000 and effectively set up in 2001. The Political 
and Security Committee (PSC) is the king pin of CSDP and crisis management in the 
EU: under authority of the Council, the PSC keeps track of CSDP and endorses the 
political and strategic control of EU military operations and CSDP missions. The PSC 
works closely with the EU Military Committee (EUMC), which is the highest military 
institution in the frame of the EU Council. The EUMC provides military advice to 
36 Dumoulin, A.; Mathieu, R.; Sarlet, G. La politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD): de 
l’opératoire à l’identitaire: genèse, structuration, ambitions, limites. Préface de Javier Solana, Bruxelles, 
Bruylant, Coll. « Organisation internationale et relations internationales », 2003, n°54.
37 Elias defines a social configuration as a concrete situation of interdependence between the individuals or 
the states (Elias, N. Qu’est-ce que la sociologie? Paris: Pocket Agora, 1993, p. 158). The flexibility of the 
concept enables to use it either at a micro level (individuals, and more precisely here soldiers, diplomats and 
civilian experts) or at a macro level (states, European system, world system, social structure…). 
38 Mérand, F., 2003, supra note 14; Mérand, F., 2006, supra note 14.
39 This is the title of the European Security Strategy announced by EU High Representative Solana on the 
European Council in Brussels on 12th December 2003. Solana, in Gnesotto, N., supra note 34, p. 6.
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the PSC and directives to the EU Military Staff (EUMS). Its role is also to provide 
military expertise to Javier Solana and monitor EU military operations. Both organs are 
intergovernmental structures. In addition to them, integrated structures are requested 
to manage crisis in coordination with the PSC and EUMC: these are mostly the High 
Representative for CFSP (Javier Solana) helped by a Policy Planning and Early Warning 
Unit (PPEWU) and the EUMS backed by the Politico-Military Group. The EUMC’s 
main function is provided the PSC with strategic planning, early warning and military 
monitoring. A civil-military cell has more precisely been created within the EUMS in 
200540 to insure contingency planning and strategic planning and increase cross-pillar 
coordination in CSDP. Moreover, the EU took over the WEU military tools as the WEU 
was merged into the EU framework by the end of 2000. These tools consist of a satellite 
center (Torrejon), and Institute for Security Studies (Paris), which produces expert 
reports. In addition to these organs a European Armament Agency has been launched 
in 200441 so as to help the coordination of arm procurements in Europe and a European 
Security and Defense College working in network originated in 2005, under strong 
French-German commitment42. 
These organs generated common conflict and crisis management procedures in 
Brussels, with a combination of permanent monitoring, a Crisis Management Concept 
used in time of crisis, and the development of strategic options, evaluations and 
feedbacks. Concretely, when an operation concept has been agreed between the member 
states, the main work in terms of European crisis management takes place in the General 
Secretariat o the EU Council between the EUMS and the GD E VIII (responsible for 
the military aspects) and/ or the GD E IX (responsible for the civilian aspects). The all 
configuration is based on permanent contacts between the capitals and Brussels via the 
PSC and Javier Solana and his team. On an intern level in the member states, the Foreign 
offices are the ones who decide to participate or not in a European military operation or 
crisis management task, in close coordination with the Defense ministries and sometime 
the Head of state according to the constitutional rules in force (in France for instance, the 
President plays a major role regarding military operation decision-making). 
But what does CSDP and its crisis management elements changes? Before CSDP, 
the decision-making process used exclusively bilateral formats in the sector of military 
cooperation. With CSDP, the decision-making process takes now place between the 
actors located in the capital and the permanent delegates of the states and the European 
actors in Brussels, who share a way of negotiating compromises and solution. Just to 
give an example, the EU autonomous military operation in Congo in summer 2006 
was politically assumed by the diplomatic actors of the Political and Security Comity 
40 This cell is part of the Tervuren package, also known as “Chocolate Summit” on April, 29th 2003 between 
France, Germany, Belgium and Luxemburg. Britain opposed the idea of creating this cell until November 
2003 because this was seen in London as a step forward towards EU autonomy in defense matters. The EU 
cell offers the core of the emerging EU operation center launched in June 2007. Its status “within the EUMS” 
is interpreted on a twofold principle.
41 Joint Action 2004.551.CFSP.
42 Joint action 2005.757.CFSP on 18.07.2005.
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in Brussels, although the troops stay in the hand of the nation-states. We share with 
Kenneth Glarbo the assumption that “social interaction is emerging as the natural 
historical product of day-to-day practices of political cooperation. Diplomats and national 
diplomacies have internalized, in particular, the formal requirements of a Common 
Security and Foreign Policy”43. Thus one can consider CSDP as a crisis management 
tool in the making on the EU level as CSDP’s organs and procedural practices play as 
socializing agents for the military, diplomatic and political actors involved, yet much 
more for those working in Brussels as for those working in the capitals as we will show 
later in our paper. CSDP tends to normalize, even if still quite incrementally, diplomatic 
and politico-military practices in Europe.
2.1.2. European Specificity in Managing Crisis: a Large Panel of Military  
 and No-military Means in CSDP
What is at stake for the EU here is to underline the specificity of European crisis 
management developed in the framework of CSDP. On the one hand the UN keeps 
incarnating the Kantian aspiration at equality among the nations; NATO on the other 
hand -though reformed in a more political way and enlarged to the Eastern European 
countries in the late 1990’s- symbolizes much more pragmatism and search for 
efficiency than equality among nations and political civil society. Thus CSDP’s claims 
lie in between these two positions.
The first EU crisis management exercise took place in 2002 and aimed at testing 
CSDP’s procedures in this area and coordinate the whole spectrum of military and 
civilian tools. CSDP consists in providing the EU with a global and coherent capacity to 
prevent and manage crisis on both military and civilian levels. This large combination 
of instruments derives from EU’s special civilian nature and offers an added value 
regarding NATO crisis management frame exclusively based on military elements. EU’s 
crisis management “package” is inspired by a classical lecture of conflicts: preconflict 
phase, conflict and post-conflict44. This explains a mix of military and civilian tools at 
disposal in CSDP’s framework. 
2.2. Military Tools for Crisis Management in CSDP
Military capacities have quick become a very important aspect of CSDP: at the 
Helsinki IGC in December 1999 the member states determined a Headline Goal (Helsinki 
Headline Goal or HHC): by 2003, the EU should be able to deploy 60 000 soldiers 
43 Glarbo, K. Wide-awake diplomacy: reconstructing the common foreign and security policy of the European 
Union. Journal of European Public Policy. 1999, 6(4): 649−650; see also Pouliot, V. The Logic of Everyday 
Practice: The Routinization of Diplomacy in Security Communities. Paper presented at the annual meeting 
of the International Studies Association, Town & Country Resort and Convention Center, San Diego, 
California, USA, 2006.
44 Aligisakis, M. (dir.). Europe et sortie de conflits. Genève: Institut Européen de l’Université de Genève, 2005, 
p. 28.
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within 60 days and sustain them over a year; this EU rapid reaction force should be able 
to accomplish the whole spectrum of the Petersberg Tasks. CSDP’s operationality has 
been officialized at Laeken in December 2001. The Headline Goal 2010 is even more 
ambitious: the decision to intervene militarily should be taken at the latest 5 days after 
the approval of a Crisis Management Concept y the member states and the EU Council, 
so that the operation could be set up under 10 days. But this doesn’t mean anyway 
that the EU member states are willing to set up a European army: deploying troops on 
a crisis theater is still a national sovereign decision. In June 2004, a further military 
instruments has been created on the basis of the lessons-learned from operation Artemis 
in Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003: the Battle Groups (or BG)45. These Battle 
Groups are based on multinationality and are composed of 15000 soldiers, aiming at 
providing the EU with a concrete rapid reaction capacity so as to respond an urgent 
crisis or intervene under UN Security Council request. These Battle Groups constitute a 
proactive process in the frame of CSDP and developed in parallel with NATO Response 
Force (NRF). France proposed 12 000 men, Germany 13 5000 men and Britain 12 500 
men46. Yet the BGs also raise lots of questions regarding the persisting national analyzes 
and red lines applied to national troop deployments. 
Thus EU already leads several military operations: two were conducted under the 
Berlin Plus mechanism in Macedonia in 2003 (operation Concordia) and in Bosnia in 
2004-2005 (operation Althea)47. But this mechanism constitutes a critical limitation for 
some authors, as it seems impossible to imagine that NATO would put its capacities 
at EU’s disposal if Washington expresses an opposition48: thus Berlin Plus is seen as a 
means from the USA to limit European autonomy in crisis management and strategic 
planning49. But the two first really European operations not relying on NATO capacities 
are the operation Artemis in 200350 and the operation EUFOR Congo in 2006, both 
taking place in Democratic Republic of Congo. Artemis functioned under the lead-nation 
framework (France leading the OHQ and FHQ with the concourse of soldiers from other 
member states) and was typically a peace enforcement task51, whereas EUFOR Congo 
45 The concept has been launched in June 2004 by a French-British-German initiative and deepened in 2005. 
The BG are requested to be ready for deployment under 5 to 10 days, stay on the crisis theater at least 3 
months and be able to intervene up to 6000 km away from Brussels. They are backed up with naval and air 
capabilities. From January 2007, they are 13 BGs registered, among which 2 are permanently in alert for 6 
months.
46 Petiteville, F., supra note 25, p. 87.
47 Berlin Plus is an agreement derived from the debate on the European Security and Defense Identity in the 
1990’s and the notion of European pillar within NATO. It was agreed on 2002 that the EU could have an 
access to NATO common planning capacities in the case of an operation where NATO is not engaged. Berlin 
Plus is a compromise agreement named after the NATO Berlin summit of 1996 which inaugured the concept 
of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) so as to guarantee the automaticity of access to NATO common 
capacities for the Europeans in order not to reiterate such an impotent situation as in Bosnia.
48 Dumoulin, A.; Mathieu, R.; Sarlet, G., supra note 36, p. 294. 
49 Gnesotto, N., supra note 34, p. 26.
50 Joint Action 2003/423/PESC.
51 Aligisakis, M., supra note 44, p. 34.
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consisted in supervising the first democratic elections held in Congo52. 1500 soldiers 
from 18 European nations (including Turkey) were sent on the ground. EUFOR can 
be considered as a première on several levels: it is the first military operation entirely 
planed from Brussels; it marked the return of the Bundeswehr in Africa outside a UN 
mandate. Even if the forces deployed have been nationally been put at EU’s disposal, 
the PSC was politically responsible for the mission, while the EUMC defined the OHQ53 
and FHQ’s mandate. 
But the added value of European crisis management method is its capacity to 
combine the multiple facets of international action54. Thus several civilian instruments 
also back CSDP.
2.3. A Civilian Crisis Management Concept: EU’s Added-Value?
The member states also decided to develop the civilian aspects of crisis 
management in four priority areas defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: 
police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil 
protection55. These civilian tools correspond to the historically civilian nature of the 
EU56. The specific capabilities in these four fields could be used in the context of EU-
led autonomous missions, or in the context of operations conducted by lead-agencies, 
such as the UN. The member states should have committed themselves to be capable 
of carrying out any police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to 
substituting to local police forces by providing up to 5000 police officers by 2003, of 
whom up to 1 400 can be deployed in under 30 days. They have also undertaken to 
provide 200 experts in the area of the rule of law, and up to 2000 experts potentially 
deployable on the ground to help rebuild an administrative network, set up education 
systems, etc. The Ministerial Civilian Crisis Management Capability Conference held 
on 19 November 2002 confirmed that the concrete targets in the four priority areas had 
been reached and even exceeded through Member States’ voluntary commitments57. 
The police area is right now the most developed, aiming at extending the military tool in 
the post-conflict phase58. Police missions as the operation Proxima in Macedonia or the 
EU Military Police Mission (EUMP) in Bosnia give flesh to these capacities. 
52 A UN resolution was adopted on the 25.04.2006, following the request addressed by the UN to the EU on 
the 27.12.2005. The operation was launched based on the Joint Action 2006/319/PESC on the 27.04.2006.
53 The OHQ was assumed by Germany and located in the Einsatzührungskommando in Potsdam under the 
commandment of General Viereck, while the FHQ in Kinshasa was operated by the French General Damay 
assisted by the German Admiral Bess.
54 Zorgbibe, Ch. L’avenir de la sécurité internationale. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2004, p. 118.
55 Nowak, A. (dir.). Civilian crisis management: the EU way. Cahiers de Chaillot n° 90, Paris, Institut d’Etudes 
de Sécurité de l’UE, 2006, p. 19−23.
56  German foreign minister W. Steinmeier called the EU a “Zivilmacht mit Zähnen”, i.e. a civilian power with 
teeth. Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “Zivilmacht mit Zähnen”, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 8/02/2007.
57 Bagayoko, N.; Kovacs, A. La gestion interministérielle des sorties de conflit. Paris: Centre d’Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales de la défense, Coll. « Les documents du C2SD », 2007.
58 See the European Police Action Plan adopted at the European Summit in Gothenburg in June 2001. Rutten, 
M. De Nice à: les textes fondateurs de la défense européenne. Volume II, Cahiers de Chaillot n°51, Paris, 
Institut d’Etudes de Sécurité de l’UE, 2002, p. 66−72; Bagayoko, N.; Kovacs, A., ibid., p. 169.
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2.3.1. EU Operations and the European Security Strategy: a Way of  
 Implementing the European Integrated and Holistic Method of  
 Conflict Management and Socializing the Actors
According to these whole spectrum of civilian and military capacities set up in the 
framework of CSDP and implemented through more and more EU operations, one can 
assert that CSDP effectively constitutes an emerging policy for conflict management 
for the European Union. The military operations contribute to give reality to the EU 
as a global international actor59, even if these operations are still modest and mostly 
focused on soft security60. These operations and moreover the global frame of CSDP’s 
organs, tools and procedures impulses a socializing process for the diplomatic and 
politico-military actors from the member states in Brussels: one can speak of an 
emerging “Brusselsization” process61. One can understand this socializing process as 
a convergence trend towards some common elements in among the member states 
concerning crisis management, as one can also observe it in areas such as arms export 
controls in Europe62. Even if the first referent remains national for the officers particularly, 
the practice of the CSDP configuration in Brussels joints another kind of socialization 
for the soldiers: the socializing effect of European operations of crisis management63 as 
multinationality lies at the heart of European crisis management approach. This kind of 
socializing processes enable the emergence of an embryonic European strategic culture 
incarnated in the European Security Strategy (ESS) issued by Solana on December 12th 
2003 and entitled “A secure Europe in a better world”: the ESS proposes an holistic, 
multilateral and integrated approach for EU crisis management, thus responding to 
the ad hoc or à la carte American multilateralism under Bush administration64. This 
document has become a reference in the European discourse on security and a cognitive 
tool identifying global EU objectives in the long run and the corresponding set of 
tools the EU has at its disposal to solve the upcoming regional crisis. The focus on 
multilateralism and integration expresses the EU’s world view and how the EU sees itself 
59 Howorth, J. From security to defense: the evolution of the CFSP. In: Hill Ch.; Smith, M. (eds.). International 
Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 192.
60 Hill, Ch.; Smith, M. Acting for Europe: reassessing the European Union’s place in international relations. 
In: Hill, Ch.; Smith, M. (eds.). International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 402.
61 Bagayoko, N. Les officiers français et la construction européenne: l’européanisation du point de vue des 
acteurs de la défense. Paris: Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la défense, Coll. « Les documents du 
C2SD », 2005, n° 77; Bagayoko, N. L’européanisation des militaires français: socialisation institutionnelle 
et culture stratégique. Revue Française de Science politique. 2006, 56(1): 49−78.
62 Bauer, S.; Remacle, E. Theory and practice of multi-level foreign policy: the European Union’s policy in 
the field of arms export controls. In: Tonra, B.; Christiansen, T. (eds.). Rethinking European Union Foreign 
Policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.
63 Pajon, Ch. L’Europe de la défense et la transformation des identités militaires: quelle européanisation? Le 
cas des acteurs militaires britannique, allemand et français. Politique Européenne. 2003, 10: 148−171.
64 Biscop, S. La Stratégie européenne de sécurité: mettre en œuvre l’approche holistique. In: L’Europe de la 
défense: acteurs, enjeux, processus. Les Champs de Mars. Cahiers du Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
de la Défense. n°19, janvier 2008.
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in international relations65. This integrated approach plays as a joker for the EU on the 
international scene as it combines unilateral, bilateral and multilateral strategies in EU’s 
foreign policy with a differentiated approach depending on the sector: European crisis 
management can be military help, trade, economic sanctions, administrative and legal 
advice, etc. But building a real capacity of crisis management and conflict resolution in 
the EU also raises the question of the interplay between Brussels and the member states. 
What role do various foreign policy strategies of EU member states play in shaping the 
content of CSDP? What are the driving forces of different approaches? If socializing 
processes helps us understand the development of a European Defense configuration, 
the concept is also interesting to clarify the still quite diverging interpretations of the 
European Defense project by the different states, both on macro and micro level.
3. A Europeanized Way of Working out Peace? Between  
Coherence Problems and National Reflexes 
CSDP and the European crisis management instruments keep evolving through 
compromises between the various foreign policy and military traditions of the member 
states that confront in Brussels in the EU intergovernmental organs as the Council or the 
EU Military Comity, the EU Military Staff and the Political and Security Comity. These 
organs play a role of interface between Brussels and the capitals in the incremental 
elaboration of a European foreign and security policy. And yet one can not say that 
European security interests have replaced national interests: it is more of an incremental 
process through which members states adjust some marginal parts of their foreign 
policies but keep a high hand on the deep core of these policies. What they delegate to 
the CSDP’s organs in Brussels is soft security and not hard security: defense policies and 
troops deployment are still fundamentally national. The nation-state is an “obstinate” 
actor66. As Sven Biscop notes: “If the member states deploy their troops, there still is no 
consensus on the deployment under the EU flag in the crisis management area.”67.
3.1. A Recurring Leadership Problem
First of all, European crisis management approach via CSDP still suffers from 
important lacks and coherence problems68. The absence of cross-pillar synergy appears 
to be of particular importance as it shows in the speech that we obtained by the actors 
–both military and diplomatic actors in Brussels- which we interviewed between 
65 Jorgensen, K. E. A multilateralist role for the EU? In: Elgström, O.; Smith, M. (eds.). The European Union’s 
Role in International Politics. Concepts and analysis. London, Routledge: ECPR Studies in European 
Political Science, 2006.
66  Hoffmann, S. Obstinate or obsolete? The Fate of Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe. Daedalus. 
1966, 95: 862−915.
67  Our translation. Biscop, S., supra note 64, p. 35.
68  Bagayoko, N.; Kovacs, A., supra note 57; Hacker, V. Javier Solana, chef diplomate de l’Union Européenne. 
In: Les Champs de Mars. Cahiers du Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense, n°18, juin 2007.
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2005 and 2007 (over 120 interviews). CSDP still stays very fragmented: the dialogue 
between the Council and the Commission is far from evident and this lies mostly in the 
lack of a unique authority in the area of European foreign policy. CSDP’s structural 
framework even tends to encourage some administrative rivalries in crisis management 
on a European level: until CSDP was effectively launched between 1999 and 2001, 
the EU has no crisis management and strategic culture at all; Thus the organs we 
presented earlier and which are the core of European crisis management mechanisms 
within CSDP –the PSC, the EUMC and the EUMS- had largely been derived from the 
existing NATO model of organization and illustrate a stock and pipe approach which 
favors a relative airtightness between military and civilians: the political directors of 
the foreign ministries are used to the experimented NATO model and have imported 
it into the EU without questioning its validity for an exclusively civilian organization. 
The UN model with a General Secretariat exercising its authority on every dimensions 
of UN action may have probably best suited EU’s nature69. Just an example her will 
make are words clearer: the EUMC for instance tends to consider itself not as a forum 
to exchange pieces of advice about multinational military actions among the member 
states, but much more as a organ in confrontation with a political organ, the PSC: this 
illustrates a typical logic of struggle between institutional territories70 as it exists in the 
functioning of “comitology” in the first pillar policies. One can even speak of “symbolic 
struggles” between the different kind of actors71 (The division of labor in CSDP doesn’t 
allow real coordination between the Council and the Commission, which are both 
responsible for the coherence of EU’s external action and relations. The Lisbon Treaty 
didn’t solve this concurrence, although it aims at creating a European external action 
service72. This problem is more and more acute regarding the growing commitments of 
the EU in conflict management and rebuilding. Yet, some efforts have been made by the 
member states to enhance coherence in European crisis management: a first step in that 
direction consists in the nomination of two Commission representatives within the civil-
military cell, core of the future European OHQ in Brussels. What is innovating in this 
effort is that these two representatives are not under the authority of GD Relex; but this 
69 Interview in the GD E VIII, General Secretariat of the Council, Brussels, 15/11/2005.
70 More generally for CFSP, see Buchet de Neuilly, Y. La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune: 
dynamique d’un système d’action. Politix. 1999, 46: 127−146; Buchet de Neuilly, Y. L’irrésistible ascension 
du HR pour la PESC. Une solution institutionnelle dans une pluralité d’espaces d’actions européens. 
Politique Européenne. 2002, 8: 13−30; Buchet de Neuilly, Y. L’Europe de la politique étrangère. Paris: 
Economica, 2005; Buchet de Neuilly, Y., supra note 14. 
71 Deschaux-Beaume, D. Looking at European Security and Defence Policy with a historical sociological lens: 
The case of the French-German military cooperation in the sociogenesis of the CSDP. Paper presented at the 
Conference on New Approaches to Europeanization and European Integration: Social Capital, European 
Elites, Constructivism, University of Copenhagen, 26-28 April 2007; Mérand, F. L’Europe des diplomats, 
l’Alliance des militaries. La PESD comme enjeu de lutes symboliques. In: L’Europe de la défense: acteurs, 
enjeux, processus. Les Champs de Mars. Cahiers du Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense, 
n°19, janvier 2008.
72 The Lisbon Treaty proposes the nomination of an EU High Representative for foreign affairs and security 
policy who would also be vice-president of the Commission. This should enhance the coherence and 
visibility of EU external action if the Treaty is ratified and enforced. 
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of the EUMS73. Another tool has been created to help develop cross-pillar coherence: a 
civil-military coordination concept (CMCO) exists since 2003 and was generated by the 
PSC, the EUMS and the politico-military group so as to coordinate the European actors 
involved in crisis management procedures. This concept aims both at increasing cross 
pillar coordination as well as coherence within the second pillar (CFSP)74. Coherence 
also means a need for synergy with other international organizations as NATO or the 
UN. Therefore the British European Presidency developed in 2005 a project entitled 
“Comprehensive Planning” so as to better use the civil-military cell. There still are lots 
of doubts concerning these adjustments. 
Behind this question of synergy between the Council and Commission, the question 
raised by CSDP and a European way of managing conflict is the one of the democratic 
control over European Defense Policy75: as long as CSDP stays outside the control of 
the European Parliament, it can not be closer coordinated with the Commission action 
which is accountable before the European Parliament. The opposition between the most 
supranational or “pro-Commission” states as Germany and the most intergovernmentalist 
or “pro-Council” states as France and Britain does not help to solve the problem. 
Another important question meeting the lack of coherence is financing CSDP’s 
operation. Civil crisis management operations are financed by the CFSP budget (102,6 
millions Euros in 2006), which is part of the Community budget run by the Commission. 
But the use of this budget line has to be decided by the Council because CFSP –from 
which CSDP is the militarized dimension- is ruled by the intergovernmental principle. 
Military operations cannot be financed by any line of Community budget. There the 
principle is the same as within NATO: costs lie where they fall. Only a part of the costs 
involved by EU military operations are pooled; since 2004 the ATHENA mechanism 
consists in a common financing of the common costs of EU military operations under 
the rule of unanimity among the member states: this offers a case by case possibility of 
handbrake for the states not wanting to take part in some operations. Thus one does not 
pay for an operation one does not want to launch.
This global lack of synergy also put into the light a lack of leadership in the 
EU in the foreign policy area: it is quite clear here that the theoretic concept of 
Europeanization is of limited use to analyze CSDP76. The French-German partnership is 
therefore particularly interesting in security and defense matters, as the French-German 
friendship has long been considered as the cornerstone of the whole process of European 
73 Interview, EUMS, Brussels, 8/12/2005.
74 Bagayoko, N.; Kovacs, A., supra note 57, p. 181.
75 Wagner, W. Für Europa sterben ? Die demokratische Legitimität der Europäischen Sicherheits- und 
Vertidigungspolitik. Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschug (HSFK), Report 3, 2004; Wagner, 
W. The democratic legitimacy of CSDP. Occasional Paper 57, ISS-EU, Paris, 2005; Wagner, W. The 
democratic control of military power Europe. Journal of European Public Policy. 2006, 13(2): 200−216; 
Wessels, W. (dir.). The Parliamentary Dimension of CFSP/CSDP. Options for the European Convention. 
Study submitted for the European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Brussels, TEPSA, 2002.
76 Irondelle, B. Quelle européanisation de la sécurité au sein de l’Union Européenne? In: L’Europe de la 
défense: acteurs, enjeux, processus. Les Champs de Mars. Cahiers du Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales 
de la Défense, n°19, janvier 2008.
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integration. The two countries try to provide a directional leadership in the EU, but are 
still characterized by diverging conceptions of crisis management, foreign policy and 
the international role of the EU. Thus the American leadership goes on dominating de 
facto in the management of international conflicts. This leads us to a second aspect of 
the interplay between Brussels and the member states in the area of crisis management 
and moreover within CSDP.
3.2. A Tension between European Crisis Management and National  
 Security Analyzes
Even if one can underline some trends to “Brusselsization” in the social practices 
of the soldiers and diplomats involved in CSDP as we said it earlier with the term of 
socializing process, there still are very pregnant national security interests analyzes. 
The development of a European way of managing crisis in the 21st century combines 
with former trend inherited from the transformation of the armies since the 1970’s 
accelerated by the end if the Cold War. Defense budget have globally declined in the 
European countries who want to benefit from the “peace dividends”. The structure of 
the budget has also evolved in favor of means to accomplish the Petersberg Tasks. 
Almost every European country (except Germany) has now a professional army and 
mass conventional armies have been replaced by professionalized, deployable armies77. 
Military education also evolved in order to better fit the new officers generation with the 
imperatives of multinationality and European crisis management78. 
Building a European crisis management approach also incrementally shapes the 
decision-making processes. It is true that the PSC took a decisive step in the European 
crisis management decision-making: as a consensus maker between the Twenty-Seven, 
the PSC induces some incremental changes in the national decision-making processes. 
Before its creation all the negotiations in this specific area took place bilaterally or 
multilaterally between the capitals with a strong impulse of the embassies, whereas 
today the action moves to Brussels where more and more crisis are directly managed 
among the members of the permanent representations of the states. CSDP and the 
emergence of a European way of crisis management involves a changing power logic: 
the PSC counselors have a double task of assisting the national representative by the 
PSC and negotiate in the first rank within the working groups79. Soldiers, diplomats and 
77 Buffotot, P. Europe des armées ou Europe désarmée? Paris: Ed. Michalon, Coll. « Ligne d’horizon », 2005; 
Boëne, B. La professionnalisation des armées: contexte et raisons, impact fonctionnel et sociopolitique. 
Revue Française de Sociologie. « Profession: militaire. Etudes Réunies et présentées par François Gerstlé ». 
2003, 44(4): 647−694.
78 Boëne, B.; Haddad, S.; Nogues, T. A missions nouvelles des armées, formations nouvelles des officiers 
des armes? Paris: Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la défense, Coll. « Les documents du C2SD », 
2001, n° 46; Vennesson, P. (dir.). Politiques de défense: institutions, innovations, européanisation. Paris: 
L’Harmattan, Coll. « Logiques politiques », 2000; Vennesson, P. (dir.). Innovations et conduite du chan-
gement dans les armées. Recueil du cycle 2000-2001 des conférences du C2SD, Paris, C2SD, Coll. « Les 
forums du C2SD », 2002.
79 About CFSP generally, see Buchet de Neuilly, Y. Construire les instruments de la politique étrangère 
européenne. Les hauts fonctionnaires nationaux au cœur des processus bruxellois. In: Dreyfus, F.; Eymeri, 
J.-M. Science politique de l’administration. Une approche comparative. Paris: Economica, 2006.
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civil counselors that we interviewed admit shaping instructions because they can best 
assess their room to maneuver as they know better the positions of the other national 
delegations on the Brussels ground as the agents working in the national ministries80. One 
can use the image of double-edge diplomacy81, even if this “Brusselsization” remains 
still incremental: the Europeanization phenomenon keeps evolving quite marginally in 
the defense sector. Defense remains a strong attribute of state sovereignty, and as some 
authors note, CSDP will long remain intergovernmental82 European “crisis management 
policy is best understood as a fast co-ordination game in which member states react 
to international crises under tight time pressure. From this perspective, agreements 
are self-enforcing and strong institutions are not required.”83 Others prefer to speak 
of transgovernmentalism so as to integrate both the centrality of intergovernmental 
practices leaving an important room for national analyzes of security interests and the 
development of socializing processes in Brussels which weigh on the actors practices 
and involve incremental changes84. We’re more convinced by this kind of approach, 
even if in our view the added-value of our policy analysis in terms of historical sociology 
offers a way of linking even closer both macro and micro levels, that is both levels of 
structure and actor. We are closer to an analysis in terms of role as Lisbeth Aggestam 
proposes: a state foreign policy is actually strongly influenced by its national conception 
of its international role and this conception has been interiorized by its diplomatic and 
politico-military actors85.The role constitute a link between the actor and the structure 
putting into light both organizational factors and internationality (we prefer the concept 
of national habitus86 or socialization) in foreign policy decision-making. We won’t 
develop further this reflection here as the space for our purpose is limited.
What we want to point out here is that one can not say that European security interests 
have replaced national interests: it is more of an incremental process through which 
members states adjust some marginal parts of their foreign policies but keep a high hand 
80 Most of the interviews we lead between fall 2005 and winter 2007 by French and German soldiers and 
diplomats in Brussels, Paris and Berlin tend to converge on this point. 
81 Putnam, R.; Evans, P. B.; Jacobson, H. K. (eds.). Double-edged diplomacy: international bargaining and 
domestic politics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
82 Wagner, W. Why EU’s foreign and security policy will remain intergovernmental rationalist institutional 
choice analysis of European crisis management policy. Journal of European Public Policy. 2003, 10(4): 
576−595.
83 Ibid., p. 576.
84 Hill, Ch.; Wallace, W., supra note 12, p. 12; Wallace, H.; Wallace, W. Overview: the European Union politics 
and policy-making. In: Jorgensen, K. E.; Pollack, M. A.; Rosamond, B. (eds.). Handbook of European Union 
Politics. London: Sage Editions, 2006, p. 351; Winn, N. European Crisis Management in the 1980’s. In: 
Jorgensen, K. E. (ed.). European approaches to crisis management. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1997.
85 Aggestam, L. Role identity and the Europeanization of foreign policy: a political-cultural approach. In: 
Tonra, B.; Christiansen, T. (eds.). Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004; Aggestam, L. Role theory and European foreign policy. In: Elgström, O.; Smith, M. 
(eds.). The European Union’s Role in International Politics. Concepts and analysis. London, Routledge: 
ECPR Studies in European Political Science, 2006.
86 Elias, N., supra note 37; Devin, G. Norbert Elias et l’analyse des relations internationales. Revue Française 
de Science Politique. 1995, 45(2): 305−327.
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on the deep core of these policies. There a historical sociological lens combined with 
historical institutionalism helps us understanding the difficulties encountered by CSDP 
and the path dependency phenomenon in the states’ analysis of their security interests. 
The member states tend to act collectively in crisis management when their interests are 
congruent, what favors more a case by case action and underlines the still very reactive 
nature of CSDP as the Political Foreign Cooperation already was in the 1970’s-1980’s: 
“The crisis over, most government hesitate to make additional commitment to achieve 
the solidarity for which they call”87. Our comparative study on French and Germans 
diplomats, soldiers and civil counselors daily involved in CSDP (backed by others 
comparative studies involving Britain88 (show that even if these actors are conscious to 
be part of a same security community, they still keep having strong national red lines and 
confer slightly different signification to CSDP and a European crisis management way, 
which underlines a divergence of conception of EU’s role in the world. There is a strong 
dependence to the foreign policy path and conceptions developed earlier89. To illustrate 
our French-German case study, schematically, the European Defense Policy represents 
a means of counter-weighing the American unilateralism in the French diplomats and 
officers’ representation. It is an opportunity of creating a European leadership pole in 
security matters and thus bring the EU integration process further towards a global 
political entity with leadership potentialities in the long run. What is at stake is not so 
much to compete with the Atlantic Alliance than to reach a real autonomy for European 
crisis management policy, so as to enable EU to intervene in the world as a global actor, 
mostly when American interests do not incite the Americans to act (as in the Balkans 
in the 1990’s). That is why the French actors push forward in favor to the creation 
of European planning and military structures. CSDP seen by the German diplomats, 
officers and political leaders seems more seen as a way of regaining a status of normality 
for Germany and enable the Federal Republic to assume its international engagements 
in security matters. But every single discourse –both official and informal- underlines 
the vital necessity to stay clearly in good standing and terms with NATO. Enforcing a 
European crisis management policy would enable the Europeans to become attractive in 
the eyes of the American partner and to show Washington their reliability. For Britain, a 
European crisis management policy and moreover CSDP is seen as a good way to exert 
a leadership in the EU in an area not risking to strong integration, which is also a means 
of bringing closer Washington and NATO in a division of labor concerning conflict 
management in the world. 
But one of the most diverging questions between Europeans is the question of the 
relationship between EU and NATO, and the question of military operations. French 
politico-military actors tend to advocate a strict differentiation between the EU and 
NATO, arguing that NATO is a strictly military organization, whereas German and 
87 Winn, N., supra note 84, p. 125.
88 Aggestam, L., 2004, supra note 85; Mérand, F., 2006, supra note 14.
89 Pierson, P. Increasing returns, path dependence and the study of politics. EUI/RSC, Jean Monnet Chair 
Paper. 1997, 44: 251−267; Pierson, P. Politics in time. History, institutions and social analysis. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004. 
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British actors tend to be much more in favor of a more political dimension of the 
Alliance and a division of labor between the EU and NATO. Concerning EU military 
operations, the French actors tend to be very pushing for these operations, whereas the 
German actors show still reluctance for operations other than humanitarian or peace 
support. The big difference between them is the question of the use of force. “CSDP 
is a shay focal point that brings together different political representations of the role 
of a state in international security”90. A good example for this is the EUFOR operation 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo in summer 2006: to focus only on the French 
German case, the interpretations on what to do regarding the Congo case diverged for 
a while because of the pregnant weight of national traditions of conflict management 
and security interests. Similarly, the European states have lived strong discord over 
the Iraq conflict in 2003. This also raises the question of how European operations and 
crisis management are nationally legitimated in front of the national public opinion91. 
Thus one can note that the actors and states involved in CSDP still tend to consider it as 
a strategic game on a more or less self-interested way: the socializing processes differ 
from state to state. And the strategic use of European crisis management (for instance in 
Africa for France) is enabled by the lack of clear European strategic objectives: the ESS 
is a good step towards such a definition but is still to vague and leave the states a room 
of interpreting the text in their own view92.
Concluding Remarks
As we shown in this paper, the EU is since several years developing a European 
Defense Policy (CSDP) which mostly aims at managing others’ crisis. This European 
crisis management policy offers a first step towards the emergence of a European 
strategic culture, as the ESS illustrates this trend even if this document remains most 
symbolic93. The ESS offers a very global frame enabling the member states to draw 
from it only the elements which enter into congruence with their own interests, both 
on a macro level and on a micro organizational level94. CSDP and its European crisis 
management aspect raises several important questions as the relationship between 
EU and NATO; the lack of cross pillar-coherence; the persisting national analysis of 
foreign policy and security interests; the organizational and symbolic struggles among 
the organs and plurality of actors involved. Thus European crisis management is today 
more a reactive mechanism than a real proactive policy: EU has not yet demonstrated 
90 Mérand, F., 2006, supra note 14, p. 136.
91 Jorgensen, K. E., supra note 20, p. 8.
92 Aggestam, L., 2005, supra note 85; Biscop, S., supra note 64.
93 It was published after the discord over Iraq among the European states: Wallace, W. Foreign and security 
policy. The painful path from shadow to substance. In: Wallace, H.; Wallace, W.; Pollack, M. (eds.). Policy 
Making in the European Union. 5th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 451.
94 Diplomatic versus military ethos: Mérand, F., supra note 71.
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its ability to answer rapidly and efficiently a international exogenous shock95. This 
addresses the more general question of this conference about the EU in international 
affairs. The EU aims at becoming a global player in a globalized world challenged by 
the sill very pregnant foreign and defense policies of its member states. Some authors 
have defined four criteria to recognize the status of international actor: an effective legal 
recognition of his status by other states, a legal authority able to act internationally, a 
relative autonomous decision-making and a coherent set of management of its external 
relations. This criteria are ideal-types which the EU of course does not fulfill right now 
but tendencially takes as long term objectives. The EU has not until lately traditionally 
been an international actor with well-defined interests96 and this helps understanding the 
still important blockades CSDP and the European crisis management method encounters. 
Socialization also plays a major role in defining states and actors preferences in foreign 
policy: one tends to follow –of course with incremental adjustments- the path adopted 
earlier because of the increasing returns it generates. Thus Washington still plays a major 
role in international conflict management. But whatever difficulties CSDP encounters 
in making EU an international actor able to answer crisis, it incarnates the historical 
finality of European integration: the search for stability and peace. By developing its 
own way, the EU “serves peace which serves the [international] institutions”97. As 
Washington uses force massively to solve conflicts, the European method in the making 
is much more one of an indirect approach aiming at limiting violence98. This all quest 
for international identity raises theoretical challenges for the social scientists, which 
encourages us to cross the disciplinary borders to adopt an approach mixing IR theory, 
policy analysis and political science.
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ES – GLOBALIOS TAIKOS VEIKSNYS? SANDŪROS TARP ES  
KONFLIKTŲ SPRENDIMO IR NACIOLINIŲ VEIKLOS KRYPČIŲ
Delphine Deschaux-Beaume
Grenoblio politikos mokslų institutas, Prancūzija
Santrauka. Straipsnyje siekiama apžvelgti konfliktų sprendimo strategijos įtaką Euro-
pos Sąjungos strategijos ir Europos gynybos ir saugumo politikos formavimuisi (EGSP). Pa-
teikus trumpą analitinio metodo apžvalgą siekiama atsakyti į šiuos klausimus: kokia EGSP 
kilmė ir kokie jos pagrindiniai tikslai?; kokius europinius ypatumus atspindi siūlomi krizių 
valdymo metodai?; kaip šie metodai veikia ir kaip jie telkia į konfliktą įtrauktus diploma-
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tinius ir politinius karinius veikėjus? Dar vienas ne mažiau aktualus klausimas – EGSP 
formavimas Briuselio ir šalių narių santykiuose? Kokius pokyčius ši politika įneša į jų egzista-
vimą ir kokie šiuo metu akivaizdūs ir spręstini pokyčių ribojimo veiksniai? EGSP – tai euro-
piečių būdas išvengti šaltojo karo pasaulio suskirstymo; ES krizių ir konfliktų valdymo būdas, 
tarpinis tarp strategijų, kuriomis vadovaujasi tradicinės tarptautinės organizacijos, kaip, pa-
vyzdžiui, NATO, JTO ar ESBO. EGSP taip pat įkūnija trijų didžiųjų Europos Sąjungos 
šalių – Prancūzijos, Didžiosios Britanijos ir Vokietijos, įsipareigojimus Europos gynybai ir 
saugumui, siekiant atsigauti po Balkanų krizės, kai Europa liko susiskaidžiusi, negebanti 
žengti ryžtingų konflikto sprendimo žingsnių. Dėl šios priežasties šalys narės sukūrė specialius 
EGSP įgyvendinimo organus, įrankius ir procedūras. ES krizių valdymo būdų, kurie sudaro 
EGSP šerdį, išskirtinumas – originalumas ir pridėtinės vertės suponavimas. Siūloma taikyti 
integruotą karinių ir civilinių įrankių visumą. Tačiau čia kyla esminių klausimų. EGSP 
vis dar nesukūrė atskirus politinius ramsčius siejančio mechanizmo, ypač kai kalbama apie 
EGSP opercijų finansavimą. Vėl kyla klausimas dėl Briuselio ir šalių narių bendradarbiavi-
mo, t. y. karinių dalinių dislokavimas lieka nacionalinio suverenumo prioritetu, ir ES šalys 
analizuoja susidarančias situacijas atsižvelgdamos į nacionalinio saugumo interesus. Karinio 
bendrabiavimo padarinys – siekis reformuoti armijas ir karinį švietimą. EGSP teikia vilties, 
kad Europos krizių valdymo strategijos raida sustiprins ES vertybes, įgytas šioje veikloje. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: Europos integracija, gynyba, europeizacija, tarptautiniai santy-
kiai, Prancūzijos-Vokietijos gynybos politika.
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